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BOOK REVIEW
ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING
by Frank M. Coffin
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994; pp. 373, $27.50)
Reviewed by John P. Frank*
Judge Coffin,1 a former Chief Justice of the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, a former United States Congress-
man, a former Executive Department administrator, is-despite
those "formers"-presently a very bright and engaging writer. This
compact volume2 has worthwhile things to say on every aspect of
appeals, briefing, argument, deciding the cases, and getting out the
opinions. It crisply touches all the appeals phases in which we prac-
titioners are interested.
There is one odd omission. Judge Coffin talks about what he
wants in a brief: a good outline, a useful appendix, a table of con-
tents which locates issues, a concise argument, a clear conclusion,
and a discussion "that contains not one pejorative adjective or innu-
endo concerning one's opponent or the trial judge."' He omits from
his list good prose, and what is remarkable in that omission is that
Judge Coffin himself has an easy, journalistic style that makes his
book a happy read. One would suppose that a writer with so unclut-
tered a style, such a complete absence of complex sentences or con-
voluted paragraphs, would ask for the same from those writing for
him. If I may for a moment be vainglorious, the highest compliment
I ever received was an observation from a clerk in one of our courts
of appeal. The clerk said, "Yours are the only papers which come in
here that we like to read." I am sure there are others, and in any
case clerks' offices must be too busy for clerks to read many of the
filings, but I turn the phrase back on this author: Judge Coffin
writes a book I like to read.
I pass the directly utilitarian portions of the book-how to brief,
how to argue-to reach the personal story of how this judge wants
to judge. He doesn't want bench memos. He does want his clerks
to discuss the cases with him in advance so that he can be fully pre-
pared. There are cases where his only concern is trying to be certain
of what the legislature had in mind. There are others where stat-
utes, for example the antitrust laws, express a broad policy, and here
* Partner, Lewis and Roca, Phoenix, Arizona. Mr. Frank and his late partner.
John Flynn, prepared the petitioner's brief in the appeal of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
1. Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
2. FRANK M. CoFmN, ON APPEAu COURS, LAwYERnnG, Am JUDGING (1994).
3. Id. at 119-20.
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on occasion he can consider the "greatest good for the greatest
number."4 In other cases, Judge Coffin is simply looking for the law
as it is declared in the cases or in other points of intellectual origin.5
These are only a small part of the total list of judging factors dis-
cussed by the judge. He speaks of idiosyncratic prejudices: one
judge has a particular aversion to an especially foul crime, another is
intellectually bound today by his practice experience of yesterday,
and others decide on the basis of their "social policy likes and dis-
likes."' 6 Strangely, Judge Coffin never confronts the value of doing
justice, the equities, what's fair. From my distant days with Justice
Black I can recall that, while he rarely fell into a temper about a
case, his biggest explosions were at what he thought was injustice. I
remember as Judge Black's most explosive utterance, "You can't do
people that way!" A recent article by Professor Robert Martineau
quotes Judge Albert Tate of the Fifth Circuit, who wants to see that
individual justice is done.7 Judge Coffin, by contrast, writes of the
"justice nerve."8 He represents his own as twitching at unfairness
but not with a high vibration. He gives comprehensive discussion to
the limits of judicial discretion and is renowned himself as a diligent
as well as a fair judge, but he does not wear his fairness on his
sleeve.
The judge constructively blasts the over-administration of federal
appeals courts. As he observes, "As of March, 1992, 229 federal
district and circuit judges served on some twenty-seven committees
of the United States Judicial Conference."9 He believes that federal
judges now spend from one fourth to one third of their time on com-
mittee work and meetings. All these are at the cost of reducing the
judges' time to hear and decide cases.
Let me note a few of Judge Coffin's random observations that
suggest the diversity of this work. A view of his with which I enthu-
siastically concur is that the worst appellate court is the one-judge
court, the court on which the opinion has been assigned to someone
in advance and the side judges are simply among those present.' 0
He applauds moot court practice in preparation for an oral argu-
ment;" I have argued perhaps five hundred cases over a fifty-year
span and would not dream of doing the next one without a moot
court first. He has very proper disdain for superfluous dissents and
4. Id at 247.
5. Id at 247-48.
6. Id at 256.
7. Robert Martineau, Crafts & Techniques, GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 1, 33 (1994).
8. CoIN, supra note 2, at 262.
9. Id at 310.
10. Id at 168.
11. Id at 139-40.
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concurrences: "[T]hey are ruptures in the cloak of consensus ordi-
narily worn by collegiality.' 12
There are many fine judges of the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals who, regrettably, never made it to the high nine. As one
reads Coffin on liberty 3 and his critique of a whole batch of
Supreme Court opinions, 4 one's main regret is that he never got to
express those views from one notch higher on the judicial ladder.
That didn't happen. What we have instead is this worthwhile inheri-
tance for both the work-a-day lawyer and the work-a-day judge.
12. Id at 224.
13. It at 281-82.
14. Id at 295-96.
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